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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Appellant (Mr. Smith) appeals to the Utah State Court of Appeals for a 
Reversal from his conviction of Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic 
Violence in The Fourth District Court in the State of Utah, American Fork Department. 
The Utah State Court of Appeals has Jurisdiction over criminal cases from a court of 
record pursuant to Utah Code 78A-4- 103(e). 
Mr. Smith, regrets that he is not familiar enough with any particular case law -
within the ever expanding universe of case law - that would grant unbiased direction of 
review relevant to this particular case. Mr. Smith, instead, pursuant to Utah State 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 27, Respectfully defers and submits to the independent 
reason, principle, logic, authority, and experience of this Honorable Court of Appeals, to 
accurately apply, within its rulings, the principles of Truth and Accountability, while 
respecting Individual Liberty above all else, in order to preserve the Honor and Integrity 
of this very essential System of Justice. Mr. Smith also Respectfully requests that the 
Honorable Court apply the same to the de novo standard of review in the following 
Statement of Issues. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Whether or not Utah Code 76-9-201 is facially unconstitutionally overbroad and 
unconstitutionally vague and abridges the Freedom of Speech in violation of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America. 
IL Whether or not the appellant's complete, unabridged, personal and private cell phone 
records were obtained and presented at trial, in spite of his objection (p. 72-73), 
against his Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 
III. Whether or not the prosecutor, by obtaining the appellant's complete and unabridged 
cell phone records without a warrant, without a subpoena, and without the consent of 
the appellant, violated The Appellant's Third Amendment Right to be free from 
Agents employed by government to observe and record the contacts he makes with 
others within his own Home. 
IV. Whether or not the Defendant's Second Amendment Right to defend himself and his 
family is now denied under Utah Code 77-36-l(4)(e) in combination with Utah Rules 
for Criminal Procedure Rule 22(c)(2) , and also in violation of Utah State Const. 
Article 1 Section 6. 
V. Whether or not the Defendant's right to a Speedy Trial was denied to him, even after 
he submitted a Motion for Speedy Trial (see Motion For Speedy Trial, p. 120, 10/ 
26/09), in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
USC, Const. Amendment I 
USC, Const. Amendment II 
USC, Const. Amendment III 
USC, Const. Amendment IV 
USC, Const. Amendment V 
USC, Const. Amendment VI 
USC, Const. Amendment XIV, Section 1 
Utah State Const Article 1 Section 3 
Utah State Const Article 1 Section 6 
Utah State Const Article 1 Section 27 
Utah Code 76-9-201 
Utah Code 77-36-1 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Appellant, (Mr. Smith), and his ex-wife, (Mrs. Martinez), have been 
divorced since January, 2003, and share Joint custody of two boys, presently ages 11 and 
13, and at the time of the incident 8 and 10 (p. 68). Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, in 
which Mr. Smith is the petitioner, "Any parental duties or rights not specifically address 
in this plan shall be discussed and mutually decided by both parents. Should the parties 
5 
have a dispute regarding parenting of the children; the petitioner will make the final 
decision (Exhibit 10) (p. 112)." For the first two years of this divorce, the relationship 
was extremely cooperative and friendly (p. 68 & 104-105). However, after several 
incidences this divorce turned from amicable to acrimonious (p. 105). 
Mrs. Martinez called in to American Fork City Police Department on January 8, 
2008, to complain that she was receiving calls from her ex-husband and that he was 
calling her names like whore, skank, and white trailer park trash (p. 69). Mr. Smith was 
contacted by an officer Bullock and notified that he had received a complaint from his 
ex-wife. Mr. Smith admitted that he had used those terms in the past, but in anger (p. 
162). Mr. Bullock did not determine the reason for these calls (p 165-166). Mr. Smith 
was advised to be 'civil', when communicating about the children (p. 162). 
Mrs. Martinez complained to American Fork City Police on March 20, 2008, 
that she was receiving text messages from Mr. Smith that were demeaning to her and to 
her boyfriend (now husband) Daniel F. Martinez (p.95). Mrs. Martinez, submitted a text 
message dated March 17, 2008, and several other handwritten and typed up text messages 
(Exhibits 2-9) from Mr. Smith to American Fork City Police Department, and continued 
to submit further copies of offensive messages while an investigation was conducted 
upon Mr. Smith. 
Nearly 11 months later, Mr. Smith sent a text message to Mrs. Martinez dated, 
February 06, 2009, which emphatically expressed Mr. Smith's objections to his ex-wife 
taking his children to her Mormon church, and warned her that he would file a Motion to 
Show Cause if she continued to do so without first mutually discussing and addressing 
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his concerns {see Exhibit 21). One week later, on February 13, 2009, a memo was 
prepared by Prosecutor Tucker Hanson to Officer Kogianes, stating that a warrant and 
affidavit had been prepared for Mr. Smith's arrest {see Attorney's Affidavit as to Order 
Compelling Discovery, Exhibit A, Memo dated February 13,2009, 03/08/2010). On 
February 26, 2009, Mr. Smith was handcuffed, arrested, and charged for a violation on 
March 17, 2008 of Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic Violence {see 
Information and Attorney's Affidavit as to Order Compelling Discovery, Exhibit A, 
Law Incident Table, Officer C. Paul, 03/08/2010) 
During the course of this prosecution, Mr. Smith submitted several requests for 
discovery information including requests for victim statements, all submitted text 
messages, and investigation records. All of these requests were denied. It was not until 
the day after the Defendant submitted his Motion for Speedy Trial {see Motion for 
Speedy Trial 10/26/09), that the Prosecutor finally submitted, along with a Motion for 
Continuance, a subpoena to T-Mobile requesting the cell phone records of Mrs. Martinez 
pertaining to all phone calls and text messages sent and received between the Defendant's 
and the alleged victim's cell phone numbers from the dates of March 17, 2008 and 
October 1, 2009. {see Motion for Continuance and Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated 
10/27/09). 
The Defendant received a Supplemental Response to Discovery Request on 
January 12, 2010, containing the full, complete, personal, and private cell phone records 
of David Smith's cell phone number from the dates of December 07, 2007 to April 08, 
2008 (see Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery. 01/12/10\ These records 
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were never requested within the prosecutor's Subpoena Duces Tecum, and the dates of 
records received are outside of the dates in this subpoena. 
Mr. Smith never gave his consent to the prosecutor to obtain these records, and 
was never notified by what means he was able to obtain them. As a result of these 
records, the Information charging Mr. Smith was expanded to the dates of December 21, 
2007 to March 18, 2008 (see Amended Information, 01/12/10). 
Mr. Smith objected to the publication of his complete private records at trial, but 
this was overruled (p. 72-73). Mr. Smith was convicted and then sentenced on August 
31, 2010 for a violation of Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic Violence. 
Mr. Smith respectfully appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Appellant, (Mr. Smith), and his ex-wife, (Mrs. Martinez), have been divorced 
since January, 2003, and share Joint custody of two boys, presently ages 11 and 
13, and at the time of the incident 8 and 10 (p. 68). 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, in which Mr. Smith is the petitioner, "Any 
parental duties or rights not specifically address in this plan shall be discussed and 
mutually decided by both parents. Should the parties have a dispute regarding 
parenting of the children; the petitioner will make the final decision (Exhibit 10) 
(p. 112)." 
3. Mr. Smith, as primary custodial parent, has an inherent as well as legal right, 
obligation, and responsibility to communicate with his ex-wife regarding her 
inappropriate behavior using whatever terms apply {self evident). 
4. Mrs. Martinez presented several text messages at trial from Mr. Smith that employ 
a surly tone and harsh vernacular {see Exhibits 2-9). 
5. The factual nature of this harsh vernacular or any demeaning terms, as well as any 
circumstances giving rise to them, was considered irrelevant at trial and therefore 
taken out of context {see The entire cross and direct of Mrs. Martinez). 
6. The purpose of, and subject matter within, each of the text message presented at 
trial was either to respond to Mrs. Martinez' communications, to make pre-
arrangements for mediation, or regarding the payment for care, or concerning the 
welfare and upbringing of the children (see Exhibits 2-9). 
7. Although Mrs. Martinez testified that she told Mr. Smith to stop sending her text 
messages. Mrs. Martinez transmitted a text message stating "You always send me 
5 page texts and I would rather have them that way. So no one gets confused about 
what was actually said." And another text sent 9/15/08 stating "Im on break but im 
going back so if you need something you need to leave a message or text." {see 
Exhibit 14). 
8. On or before March 17,2008, Mrs. Martinez called her son at daycare and invited 
him to a birthday party on the 18th of that Month (p. 145). 
9. Mr. Smith had custody of the children during the week of March 18th (p. 157). 
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10. Mrs. Martinez did not make any effort to contact Mr. Smith regarding the party 
invitation (p. 157). 
11. Mrs. Martinez submitted to American Fork City a text message dated March 18, 
2008 (Exhibit 9 ). 
12. Mr. Smith submitted into evidence a text message dated March 18, 2008 with the 
exact same date and time as Mrs. Martinez's handwritten exhibit, but containing 
completely different text (Exhibit 20). 
13. Mrs. Martinez complained to the Police on March 20th, 2008 with several 
handwritten copies of texts, regarding their demeaning nature (p.95). 
14. Mr. Smith submitted several requests for discovery information including requests 
for victim statements, all submitted text messages, and investigation records {see 
The Defendant's various motions for Discovery). 
15. None of these discovery requests were adequately resolved {see Motion for an 
Order to Compel Discovery and Answers to Bill of Particulars, 06/30/10). 
16. Mr. Smith filed a Motion For Speedy Trial on October, 26, 2009 (see Motion for 
Speedy Trial 10/26/09). 
17. In spite of Mr. Smith's Motion, the trail date of November, 3, 2009, was cancelled 
because this was in conflict with Election Day {see pretrial records, 10/../09). 
18. The day after Mr. Smith filed his Motion for Speedy Trial, the prosecutor filed a 
Motion for Continuance {see Motion for Continuance, 10/. 709) 
19. The Prosecutor submitted, along with this Motion for Continuance, a subpoena to 
T-Mobile requesting the cell phone records of Mrs. Martinez pertaining to all 
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phone calls and text messages sent and received between the Defendant's and the 
alleged victim's cell phone numbers from the dates of March 17, 2008 and 
October 1, 2009. (see Motion for Continuance and Subpoena Duces Tecum, 
dated 10/27/09). 
20. The Defendant received a Supplemental Response to Discovery Request on 
January 12, 2010, containing the full, complete, personal, and private cell phone 
records of David Smith's cell phone number from the dates of December 07, 2007 
to April 08, 2008 (see Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery, 
01/12/10). 
21. These records were never requested within the prosecutor's Subpoena Duces 
Tecum, and the dates of records received are outside of the dates in this subpoena 
(compare request, results, and dates of Supplemental Response to Request for 
Discovery, 01/12/10 and Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated 10/27/09). 
22. Mr. Smith never gave his consent to the prosecutor to obtain these records, and 
was never notified by what means he was able to obtain them. As a result of 
these records, the Information charging Mr. Smith was expanded to the dates of 
December 21, 2007 to March 18, 2008 (see Amended Information, 01/12/10). 
23. Mr. Smith objected to the publication of his complete private records at trial, but 
this was overruled (p. 72-73). 
24. Mr. Smith was convicted and then sentenced on August 31, 2010 for a violation of 
Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic Violence, (see Sentence, 
Judgment Commitment 08/31/10). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Honorable Court of Appeals has considered and ruled upon Utah Code 76-
9-201 in Provo City v. Whatcott and Provo City Corp. v. Thompson prior to 2004. Since 
this time, in 2005, this statute has been modified by Representative Dougall from 
American Fork District, who, instead of incorporating the rulings from Logan v. Huber 
and Provo City v. Whatcott, has expanded the statute to restrict, stifle, and chill even 
more protected speech, and has produced a statute which potentially criminalizes anyone 
who even attempts to communicate by cell phone and by email; the most common forms 
of remote communication today. Now nearly anyone can be put through the excruciating 
process of a prosecution and trial just to defend the intent of their communication. The 
end result of this is a severe chilling effect on intercommunication, leaving people 
atomized and more controllable. This statute is not only unconstitutionally overbroad, 
unconstitutionally vague, it is unnecessary in the face of technology that would prevent 
the evils that this statute proscribes. This statute gives improper power to vindictive ex-
wife's and jurisdictions of a majority religion or culture to maliciously punish others. 
Mr. Smith has not just a reasonable, but required, expectation of privacy within 
the aggregate of his complete personal private cell phone records. To prevent this 
privacy is to stifle and chill intercommunication. A person's complete private cell phone 
can be used to illegitimately gain a revealing profile of a person. 
The prosecution obtained these records not by warrant, not by subpoena, but by 
government spying through cell phone company agent within appellants Home, thereby 
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violating his third amendment right Mr. Smith is quartering this government paid agent, 
this Soldier, within his home by paying for the service by which he is being monitored. 
Mr. Smith has been maliciously defamed as a perpetrator of Domestic Violence. 
Mr. Smith has never so much as raised his hand in anger or malice towards a woman or a 
child; in his opinion, a man who does so is not a man. As a result of this redefined term 
'Domestic Violence', Mr. Smith has now been denied his Second Amendment right, and 
his right, guaranteed by Article 1 Section 6 of the Utah State Constitution, to own a 
reliable means of self defense. This deprivation is an unjust punishment for the crimes 
that others have committed. 
And Finally, The right to a speedy trial is an inherent and inalienable right that 
prevents undue distress upon someone falsely charged of a crime. Such a person and his 
family must live in worry and concern that he could be unjustly convicted of that crime, 
and must live with the undue shame from that accusation, and live with the crippled 
relationships that result from that accusation. To take one and a half years to try a man 
for sending demeaning text messages Is Cruel, and Malicious, and violates this 
inalienable Right. 
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ARGUMENT 
A statute that criminalizes Speech based upon the intent of the communicator 
abridges the Freedom of Speech, and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States of America. 
'"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means 
just what / chose it to mean - neither more nor less '"(Lewis Carol, 'Through the looking 
Glass') Although, they've a temper, some of them, words are incapable of causing 
physical harm; they are just vibrations of the air, or characters on a page. It is through the 
images, thoughts, and ideas that words produce within the receiver's mind that any sort of 
discomfort, or cognitive dissonance, can be caused. A person's perception and reaction 
to certain words depends a great deal upon the person's individual personality, culture, 
and experience with such words. 
Regardless of a person's reaction to certain words, the criminalization of Speech 
is the criminalization of Thought; and to make a law that abridges the Freedom of Speech 
is to invite the most horrific forms of Abuse, Tyranny, and Dystopia within a society. To 
be able to control the Thoughts of citizens, and to only allow those 'nice', 'inoffensive', 
'un-intimidating' thoughts to occur within their minds, is a very effective method of 
domesticating the public into a pusillanimous heard of sheep that can be fleeced, taxed, 
and culled, as the Master chooses, while that blissful heard grazes in the pasture and 
chews on the grass, only being alarmed by those who introduce thoughts that are not 
allowed. 
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The Founders of this Great Nation, and especially those who signed their names 
to the Declaration of Independence, knew Ml well the abuses that result from the power 
to sentence to harsh punishment, and even to death, those who had the temerity to express 
their own True and Ingenuous sentiments against the King or others in his favor. This 
Nation was founded upon and with and by the Freedom of Speech, and a very many 
Great Brave Men have sacrificed their own lives to defend this and other Freedoms. 
More recent history has shown, through the mass murdering collectivist regimes 
of Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China — all of which began their tyranny 
with the suppression of speech and control of the press — that We the People have far, 
far, far, more to fear from the unchecked and unaccountable power of our Own 
Government than from the most hateful and protective resource bearing nation opposed 
to the U.S., the most deplorable and deranged mass murdering criminal, the most clever 
and brutally effective terrorist, and even the most annoying, alarming, intimidating, 
offensive, abusive, threatening, harassing, frightening, and disruptive text messager alive 
on this planet. 
James Madison, the Father of the Constitution, introduced the Freedom of 
Speech clause to Congress by stating "The people shall not be deprived or abridged of 
their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments {see Annals of Congress, 
434(1789))." This clause was broadened in scope to state "Congress shall make no law 
abridging the Freedom of Speech." To grant to government the power to criminalize 
speech is to grant government the power to condemn, by deprivation of liberty and 
property, those who only condemn verbally. This First Amendment restriction upon 
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Congress, and Fourteenth Amendment restriction upon the States, prevents the inevitable 
abuses that would result from this power to criminalize speech, while not completely 
restricting civil remedy for those who are improperly defamed and truly harmed by the 
malicious speech of others. 
This Electronic Communication Statute, by criminalizing the speech with a 
particular intent, lessens in extent, and shortens by omission, the free communication of 
others, and thereby, by definition, abridges the Freedom of Speech and violates the Law 
proscribed by the First Amendment. The People shall be free, from the threat of criminal 
charges, to express their True and Ingenuous sentiments regardless of the vernacular or 
intent of their expression. To second guess, or call into question, under pain of criminal 
punishment, the intent of a person's attempt to communicate has a severe chilling effect 
on Speech and intercommunication. This statute must be overturned. 
This Electronic Communication Harassment statute employs terms of intent that 
are unconstitutionally vague and undefined in order to suppress the Freedom of Speech. 
This Statute, obfuscated by sophistry, employs a long list of vague, undefined, 
scary and harmful sounding words, some of them with tempers — such as to annoy, 
alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, frighten and disrupt — to describe a 
communication intent that is to be restricted by law under pain of criminal charges. All 
of these listed intents are constitutionally protected. Regardless, the vagueness of this 
statute leaves the public, as well as police officers, uncertain as to exactly what type of 
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communication will result in criminal action against a person, and thereby severely chills 
even the most innocuous attempts to communicate. 
A real world example of the severe chilling effect of this statute and the 
vagueness of its proscriptions comes from an actual discussion of whether or not to call 
other members of a Toastmasters group a day before the meeting to remind them of their 
assignments. It was decided that there could be criminal penalties for annoying 
communications, and that to call and remind someone of their assignment could also be 
seen as annoying or harassing someone into fulfilling their commitments, and so could 
result in criminal actions if someone vindictive enough were to file a complaint. 
The term 'alarm5, is extremely vague. A call from a neighbor with the intent to 
'alarm' that neighbor that their house is on fire could result in criminal penalties of six 
months in prison a several thousand dollars fine? 
The term 'intimidate' is an unconstitutional restriction and unconstitutionally 
vague. To contact a legislator advising him that he is violating his Oath of Office by 
passing a certain piece of legislation, and by reminding him that there are penalties for 
this, could be considered an intent to intimidate and could result in criminal charges. 
The term 'offend' is unconstitutionally vague. Some people go out of their way 
to be offended by any little thing; these people must be avoided at all cost. Contacting 
your legislator to describe the piece of legislation that he just proposed, where the most 
flattering term to describe such legislation would be 'piece of turd', could be deemed an 
intent to offend, and result in criminal charges. 
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The term 'abuse' is perhaps the most abused term in the English language; it has 
been forced to mean so many different things whether they apply or not. What is abuse, 
and whether the silent treatment is emotional abuse or not, can now be contested in this 
society. If with the intent to emotionally abuse, a person does not answer his phone, 
would this result in criminal charges? 
The term 'threaten' is also vague. To send a text message stating that legal 
action will be taken if you continue to take my boys to your church without first mutually 
discussing and deciding my concerns first, can be seen as a threat Is such a statement a 
criminal act? 
The term 'harass' is vague. Again, to call and remind your fellow Toastmasters 
of their assignments every week could be considered harassment and result in criminal 
charges. 
The term 'frighten' is also vague. A call to the neighbor with the intent to 
frighten them regarding a situation where their child is playing too close to the very deep 
canal could result in criminal charges? 
The term 'disrupt' is unconstitutional and also vague. To leave a long winded 
voice message on a recipients voice mail, thereby filling it up, or a lengthy 5 page long 
text message, as 'preferred' by your ex-wife, could result in criminal charges? 
Each and every term presented in this statute presents a dilemma for Law 
enforcement officers, as well as private citizens, regarding whether a particular 
communication attempt, could potentially be seen as a criminal act. Therefore, this 
statute must be ruled unconstitutionally vague by the Honorable Court. 
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The Appellant Mr. Smith, as primary custodial parent of his children, has an 
inherent and inalienable right as well as the legal duty, obligation, and the responsibly to 
verbally defend the integrity of his children, and to communicate with his ex wife to 
express his disapproval of behavior that he finds is destructive to his children. 
The Court of appeals found that in Provo v. Thompson the unwanted call 
provision was not unconstitutionally overbroad because "there is no right to audibly 
invade another's honle or place of business by telephone ring in an attempt to 
commandeer her listening ear when she has affirmatively expressed a desire to be left 
alone {Provo v. Thompson 2002 UT App 63 at f 24). 
First, in this case here, Mrs. Martinez neither lives nor works in American Fork 
City, and therefore any complaint that her home or business was invaded by ringing 
telephone cannot be addressed within the jurisdiction of American Fork. 
Second, Mrs. Martinez is under contract, by Decree of Divorce, which she 
agreed to and signed of her own free will, to mutually communicate with Mr. Smith 
regarding the education, health, welfare, etc. of the children. And Mr. Smith has a 
legitimate right to communicate with his ex-wife for those purposes and also to express 
his concern for the welfare, safety, and integrity of his boys, regardless of any request to 
not do so. 
If Mrs. Martinez truly wished to have all offensive communications cease, then 
she would have made efforts to cooperate with the mediation arrangements Mr. Smith 
was trying to set up so that an intermediary form of communication could be negotiated, 
instead of sending a text message stating "You always send me 5 page texts, in fact I 
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prefer them that way, that way no one gets confused about what was said", and then 
playing the role of the Tar Baby, and then afterwards, setting up incidences, such as 
calling the children at daycare to invite them to a birthday party during the other parents 
care and custody time, and without first contacting the custodial parent to make sure that 
this wouldn't interfere with his plans, and knowing full well that the invited child would 
be severely disappointed with the custodial parent if he refused, and also knowing that 
this would put the child into the precarious position of intermediary and messenger, and 
also knowing full well that an angry and offensive and demeaning text message could 
result from such an incident, and ultimately knowing that the angry and offensive 
portions of this text message could be taken to the police, and could be used to have her 
ex-husband charged, or worse - intrusively investigated - after she complained to them 
that 'Oh my, I declare, I just don't know why my ex-husband is such a jerk and so rude 
and demeaning towards me, I'm just an innocent church goer who couldn't do no harm, I 
just want him to stop' 
With or without a decree of divorce, and whether or not he has been requested or 
informed to not contact the recipient, a concerned primary custodial father has the right to 
contact the electronic communication device of his ex-wife: 
1. When the ex-wife has volunteered his son to a to a birthday party during the 
fathers custody time, and without notifying the father, and the father needs to 
know where his son is after finding he was not at daycare. 
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2. When he learns from his children that they are being taught how to get 'free 
stuff from Wal-Mart by his ex-wife's boyfriend, but they're not supposed to 
tell - and then finds out that they then went back to the boyfriends place to play 
with these 'free toys' while she and her boyfriend went back to his room to 
have indiscreet sex such that the children, being concerned for their mother's 
safety, walked in on the act. 
3. When he finds out that his children had spent a day at the Lagoon riding on rides 
and riding on the lap of a complete stranger who his ex-wife had just met less 
than two weeks before, and who turns out to have been accused twice of rape, 
has a conviction of cohabitant abuse, and two violations of a protective order 
among other things. 
4. When he has reason to believe that his ex-wife is abusing the daycare 
arrangement, and causing him to pay for half of the cost of illegitimate 
expenses, and also when he has reason to believe that the ex-wife is abusing 
the children's child support payments. 
5. To get any homework assignments left at the ex-wife's home, at the end of the 
school term, so that his child can pass the third grade. 
6. To make any arrangements or pre-arrangements for mediation. 
7. To discuss the education, religious upbringing, health and welfare of his minor 
children. 
8. To discuss arrangements for vacations, and extraordinary custody time issues. 
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9. To respond to communication attempts from his ex-wife, including any response 
to the repeated calls and text messages disrupting his own Christmas 
celebrations with his children. 
As a result of the unwanted calls provision of this statute, the Appellant, Mr. 
Smith, his children, and his relationship with his children has been severely harmed. As a 
result of this statute Mr. Smith was prevented from mutually discussing and deciding the 
religious upbringing of his children regarding the incompatible beliefs of the LDS 
religion and his own beliefs to his and his children's great detriment. And the list of 
grievances go on and on from here. 
There is an unwritten rule -as ancient as man — that states 'you do not watch 
what goes on at another man's fire.' This is sage advice that keeps intertribal conflict to a 
minimum. To interfere with and to offer unwarranted pity, support, validation, advice, 
and perhaps even vengeance - without knowing, or even wanting to know, or without 
even being entitled to know, the both sides of a conflict - almost always inevitably invites 
irreparable disaster upon any relationship and especially the one side you are trying to 
help. 
American Fork City has stepped into a conflict where they do not have 
jurisdiction, and has made zero effort to get both sides of this conflict, and in fact has 
made a deliberate effort to avoid getting both sides of this conflict. American Fork City 
must be at least re-advised by this Honorable Court. 
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The provision in this statute that criminalizes Speech, even after the person has 
been requested or informed to not contact the recipient restricts, stifles and chills an 
entire universe of constitutionally protected and legitimate communication. 
A person has the right to initiate communication with another person when, 
among other things, there is a legitimate family, social, or business issue at hand. In 
addition to the rights of a parent to verbally defend the welfare of his children, there are 
several other example categories of legitimate calls prohibited under this section of this 
statute, even under the unwanted calls provision: 
1. Calls from a mother to a young adult who has recently moved out of the family 
home, and who calls too frequently, even after being advised to not call, but is 
overly concerned after not hearing from the young adult for an extended period of 
time. 
2. Calls from a neighbor, complaining to the owner of a dog who allows his dog to 
run free throughout the neighborhood, and finds out again, that after repeated 
complaints, and even after being informed to not ever call again, that owner's dog 
continues to use his yard as a toilet. 
3. Calls from a consumer wanting a refund from the producer of a product that falls 
far from the advertised quality of that product, even after the producer of this 
defective product advises the consumer to not call again. 
4. Calls from a client to his lawyer requesting the status of his case and is instead 
advised that he need not call again. 
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5. Calls from a constituent to a legislator to protest the legislators stand on an issue, 
even after he has been informed to not call again. 
This statute not only sweeps within its ambit a wide variety of legitimate and 
constitutionally protected speech, this statute completely disrupts and overrides any 
attempts from those truly violated individuals who only seek a verbal resolution to their 
conflict at hand. By criminalizing these attempts to communicate, individual conflict 
resolution is prevented. Resentment builds and festers. And people are forced into the 
last only recourse of legal resolution, which is prohibitively expensive for most, and 
almost always ends unsatisfactorily for both. 
This statute gives an incredible amount of power to vindictive ex-wives, to 
charlatans, to the producers of defective products, and to the legislators who give away or 
sell the Freedoms of their constituents. It gives these people the power to turn the tables 
on those who even attempt to complain about improper action, and allows them to be 
charged, tried, and potentially convicted to 6 months in prison, and several thousand 
dollars fine. 
This statute also gives an incredible amount of power to jurisdictions of major 
religious influence to prosecute those cultures who do not use the vernacular of the 
majority religious group, and who instead commonly uses an 'inappropriate and 
unacceptable' vernacular as a matter of course. This case at hand is a perfect example of 
these abuses of power that result from this Statute. Mr. Smith prays that this Honorable 
court finds this entire statute overbroad and unconstitutional. 
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This statute, instead of serving the People, oppresses the People, and serves the 
cell phone corporations who profit from the enforcement of this harassment law, far more 
than the most cell phone harassed victim. 
With the progress of electronic communication technology, and especially with 
the invention of the cell phone device, people have come to experience the great 
convenience of being able to communicate with nearly anyone, nearly anywhere, and at 
nearly any time. At the same time, however, people have come to experience the 
inherent inconvenience of being able to communicate with nearly anyone, nearly 
anywhere, and at nearly any time. This inherent inconvenience can be mitigated through 
the ever evolving technological advances such as the power button, delete message 
feature, ringer silence and vibrate, call forwarding, caller id, and even call number 
blocking. 
In fact, it is the responsibility of the cell phone owner to disable the device 
during times when it is unwanted and inappropriate to receive calls - and it is Not the 
fault of the caller to that owner, when there is a disruption of the peace within a Court 
room, within a quiet theater, during quiet personal times, or even during religious 
services by the ringing cell phone of a negligent owner of that cell phone device. 
Sadly, there are those instances when a person is requested or informed to not 
contact the recipient, and that person continues to do so. And while such requests should 
be respected in the majority of circumstances, there are many diverse and constitutionally 
protected times when it is legitimate to disregard such a request. Even in these cases, a 
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recipient of unwanted communication could have the empowering technology of call 
number blocking to eliminate unwanted communication. 
This call number blocking technology has been available for some time and is 
only available within certain calling plans. To take advantage of this technology would 
be as simple and as easy as a service call to the telephone company service provider and -
- voila — no more unwanted calls from those psychotic ex-wives, and those jerk ex-
husbands, and all those telephone companies who have made it a point to call everyone in 
America during dinner time to ask if they wanted to come back to their service. And all 
of this without the cost and expense to the tax payer for the servicing of a criminal 
complaint, a prosecution, a trial, and the expense of 6 months jail time to keep a cell 
phone harassment offender. Unfortunately, this service is not provided freely by 
telephone service providers, since to give this service away would be bad business and 
would nullify a very lucrative supply of revenue from the phone records requests and 
payments from law enforcement agencies to enforce these harassment laws. 
The Legislation of this State can and should prohibit menacing and threatening 
calls. However, the legislation of this State is bound by its own sacred Honor, by Oath 
and Affirmation, to uphold, protect and defend the inherent and inalienable Rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution, whether they personally agree with them or not. The 
Legislation of this state has a greater duty to regulate the corporations who wish to do 
business within this state, especially when this legislation goes to preserve the rights of 
individual citizens. 
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The Utah State Legislation has the power to require that phone service providers, 
who wish to do business within this state, must offer to potential customers this call 
number blocking service as requisite to conducting business in this state. It is interesting 
to notice that Rep. John Dougall, from American Fork District — the author of this 
recently changed statute, and who, as an electrical engineer, and who advertises himself 
as one of the most technically capable legislators - has not even considered this 
empowering technology, which would save taxpayers money, as a solution to stop 
harassing phone calls. It is also interesting to notice that Mr. Dougall receives a vast 
majority of his campaign contributions from "Communications and Electronics" 
industries, and has received substantial contributions from AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast 
{see FollowTheMoney.org, John Dougall UT, 2008). 
This Statute of Electronic Communication Utah Code 76-9-201, is clearly 
unconstitutional, oppresses the public, and was introduced for an invalid purpose. Mr. 
Smith Prays that the Honorable Court will find this statute obsolete, anachronistic, 
unnecessary, and Unconstitutional. 
Mr. Smith's complete, unabridged personal and private cell phone records were 
obtained and presented at trial, in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 
An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy within the aggregate of his 
complete personal private cell phone records. This expectation is not just reasonable it is 
necessary to prevent the chilling effect on intercommunication and association. The 
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aggregate of a person's phone records can reveal calls to particular types of medical care, 
reveal a person's political affiliations, reveal the associations and relations of a person, 
reveal embarrassing or improper, but not illegal conduct which could be used to 
manipulate the person. A person's complete private cell phone record can be extremely 
revealing and can be used to illegitimately gain an improper profile of a person. 
The Prosecutor in this trial, by some means other than by Warrant particularly 
describing the relevant records, and particularly describing the particular dates, was able 
obtain the full and complete, personal and private, cell phone records of the Defendant 
against the Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to privacy. And, by obtaining these 
complete and private records, the Prosecutor was able to modify the Information charging 
the Defendant to span a broader range of dates. And also, from the information within 
this record, the prosecutor was able to determine that calling Mr. Martinez to the stand 
would be detrimental to his case. And also, by hanging over the head of the Defendant 
any potentially embarrassing records, the Prosecutor was given greater leverage to 
attempt a lucrative plea bargain. Far, far, more egregious than that, the prosecutor has 
publicly presented, at trial, these complete, unabridged, personal and private records, 
which are above and beyond the scope of relevance in the given case, in spite of the 
Defendant's objection, at trial, that these records were obtained against the Defendant's 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 
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The prosecutor, by obtaining the appellant's complete and unabridged cell phone 
records without a warrant, without a subpoena, and without the consent of the appellant, 
has violated The Appellant's Third Amendment Right to be free from Agents employed 
by government to observe and watch him, within his own Home. 
The prosecutor in this case, by obtaining the complete, unabridged, personal, and 
private cell phone records of the Appellant, without a Subpoena, without a Warrant, and 
without Mr. Smith's consent, and through whatever cell phone company agent employed 
by the prosecutor or some other government agency, has violated the Third Amendment 
more so than the Fourth Amendment. Such a violation is at least as relevant, as 
intrusive, as violating, as intimidating, and as deplorable as the quartering of Soldiers in 
a person's Home, without the Owner's consent, to watch over the Owner's shoulder to 
record every word typed on the computer, to watch and record every web page visited, 
to listen in on every conversation whispered over the cell phone, and to also precisely 
record the time date and duration of every contact made to others by the Owner of that 
Home. The Founders of this Great Nation could have never predicted the technology 
that would make such an intrusion by government into the personal Homes of Citizens 
possible. It Is the very intent of these Brave and Brilliant Men, within this Third 
Amendment, to prevent such violations and intrusions by government. 
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Mr. Smith's Second Amendment Right to defend himself and his family is now 
denied under Utah Code 77-36-l(4)(e) in combination with Utah Rules for Criminal 
Procedure Rule 22(c)(2), and also in violation of Utah State Const. Article 1 Section 6. 
It is a malicious defamation and an absurdity to accuse a man of Domestic 
Violence for transmitting a demeaning text message to his e-wife. It is equally 
demeaning to those victims of Domestic Violence who nearly die from what is 
commonly known as - but has now has been deceptively redefined - as Domestic 
Violence. It is Orwellian to allow the Legislature to continuously redefine 'Domestic 
Violence, and to arbitrarily add to the list certain offenders that can be categorized by this 
term. For certain, the Legislation would not even be concerned about adding offenders to 
this list of 'Domestic Violence5 violators if it weren't possible, through this classification, 
to deprive a substantial and feisty portion of the population of their right to defend 
themselves from a rogue government. 
It is an unfair and unjust punishment to deprive a man - who has never owned 
and has never misused a firearm for an improper purpose - of his right to this reliable 
means of self defense. To do so, is to unjustly punish that man for the crimes committed 
by others. Mr. Smith prays that the Honorable Court find Utah Code 77-36- l(4)(e) and 
Utah Rules for Criminal Procedure Rule 22(c)(2), an unconstitutional deprivation of 
rights. 
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Mr. Smith's right to a Speedy Trial was denied to himu even after he submitted a 
Motion for Speedy Trial (see Motion For Speedy Trial p. 120, 10/ 26/09) , in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment. 
Mr. Smith clearly and emphatically objected to any proposed delay to the trial of 
this case within his Motion for Speedy Trial. Still, this trial was cancelled due the trial 
date of November 3, 2009, was in conflict with Election Day. The prosecutor was clearly 
not prepared to go to trial, as evidenced by his Motion for continuance submitted the Day 
after Mr. Smith's motion. By gaining a delay of this trial, the prosecutor was also 
afforded the time to go on a fishing expedition into the ill gotten phone records of Mr. 
Smith so that they could try Mr. Smith for an incident that might stick. 
The right to a speedy trial is an inherent and inalienable right that prevents 
undue distress upon someone falsely charged of a crime. Such a person and his family 
must live in worry and concern that he could be unjustly convicted of that crime, must 
live with the undue shame from that accusation, and the destroyed and crippled 
relationships that result. To take one and a half years to try a man for sending demeaning 
text messages to his irresponsible and vindictive ex-wife Is Cruel, and Malicious, and 
violates this inalienable Right. 
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that the Honorable Court reverse his conviction 
of Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic Violence with prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wherefore The Appellant, Mr. Smith, has shown that this statute of Electronic 
Communication Harassment, Utah Code 76-9-201, is unconstitutionally overbroad and 
unconstitutionally vague, and opens the door for all forms of malicious and jurisdictional 
abuses, and is an unnecessary statute that serves the cell phone providers and oppresses 
the people, and also abridges the Freedom of Speech as it restricts, stifles and chills 
intercommunication; 
And, Whereas, Mr. Smith has shown that the prosecution in this case has 
violated his fourth amendment right to privacy and has published his, complete, 
unabridged, personal, and private cell phone records at trial and against his objection that 
these were unlawfully obtained; 
And, Whereas, Mr. Smith has shown that the prosecutor, by obtaining Mr. 
Smith's complete, personal, and private phone records, without a warrant, without a 
subpoena, and without his consent, has violated Mr. Smith's Third Amendment Right to 
be free from Agents employed by government to observe and record the contacts he 
makes with others within his own Home. 
And, Whereas, Mr. Smith has shown that, Utah Code ... has improperly and 
maliciously defamed him as a perpetrator of Domestic Violence, and that, along with 
UCRP Rule 22(c)(2), has violated Mr. Smith's Second Amendment Right to a reliable 
means of self defense; 
And Whereas, Mr. Smith has shown that his right to a Speedy trial has been 
violated to his great detriment; 
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Mr. Smith Respectfully Prays that the Honorable Court will Reverse his 
conviction of Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic Violence. And, Mr. 
Smith Prays that the Honorable Court will rule to repair the Defects of Law in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this I € T 4 - day of March, 2011. 
<b>3£ JJQ£) 
David Smith 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, by first class mail, to the office of the prosecutor a 
true and accurate copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BREIF on this &**{ day 
of March, 2011, to the following addresses: 
American Fork City Prosecutor 
Hansen, Wright, Eddy & Haws 
233 South Pleasant Grove Blvd., Ste. 202 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
\^J& JUZ3 
David Smith 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A 
76-9-201. Electronic communication harassment — Definitions — Penalties. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Adult" means a person 18 years of age or older. 
(b) "Electronic communication" means any communication by electronic, electro-
mechanical, or electro-optical communication device for the transmission and reception 
of audio, image, or text but does not include broadcast transmissions or similar 
communications that are not targeted at any specific individual. 
(c) "Electronic communication device" includes telephone, facsimile, electronic mail, 
or pager. 
(d) "Minor" means a person who is younger than 18 years of age. 
(2) A person is guilty of electronic communication harassment and subject to 
prosecution in the jurisdiction where the communication originated or was received if 
with intent to annoy, alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, frighten, or disrupt 
the electronic communications of another, the person: 
(a) (i) makes repeated contact by means of electronic communications, whether or not 
a conversation ensues; or 
(ii) after the recipient has requested or informed the person not to contact the recipient, 
and the person repeatedly or continuously: 
(A) contacts the electronic communication device of the recipient; or 
(B) causes an electronic communication device of the recipient to ring or to receive 
other notification of attempted contact by means of electronic communication; 
(b) makes contact by means of electronic communication and insults, taunts, or 
challenges the recipient of the communication or any person at the receiving location in a 
manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response; 
(c) makes contact by means of electronic communication and threatens to inflict 
injury, physical harm, or damage to any person or the property of any person; or 
(d) causes disruption, jamming, or overload of an electronic communication system 
through excessive message traffic or other means utihzing an electronic communication 
device. 
(3) (a) (i) Electronic communication harassment committed against an adult is a class 
B misdemeanor, except under Subsection (3)(a)(ii). 
(ii) A second or subsequent offense under Subsection (3)(a)(i) is a: 
(A) class A misdemeanor if all prior violations of this section were committed against 
adults; and 
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(B) a third degree felony if any prior violation of this section was committed against a 
minor. 
(b) (i) Electronic communication harassment committed against a minor is a class A 
misdemeanor, except under Subsection (3)(b)(ii). 
(ii) A second or subsequent offense under Subsection (3)(b)(i) is a third degree felony, 
regardless of whether any prior violation of this section was committed against a minor or 
an adult. 
(4) (a) Except under Subsection (4)(b), criminal prosecution under this section does 
not affect an individual's right to bring a civil action for damages suffered as a result of 
the commission of any of the offenses under this section. 
(b) This section does not create any civil cause of action based on electronic 
communications made for legitimate business purposes. 
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Exhibits 
77-36-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Cohabitant" has the same meaning as in Section 78B-7-102. 
(2) "Department" means the Department of Public Safety. 
(3) "Divorced" means an individual who has obtained a divorce under Title 30, 
Chapter 3, Divorce. 
(4) "Domestic violence" means any criminal offense involving violence or physical 
harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to 
commit a criminal offense involving violence or physical harm, when committed by one 
cohabitant against another. "Domestic violence" also means commission or attempt to 
commit, any of the following offenses by one cohabitant against another: 
(a) aggravated assault, as described in Section 76-5-103; 
(b) assault, as described in Section 76-5-102; 
(c) criminal homicide, as described in Section 76-5-201; 
(d) harassment, as described in Section 76-5-106; 
(e) electronic communication harassment, as described in Section 76-9-201; 
(f) kidnapping, child kidnapping, or aggravated kidnapping, as described in Sections 
76-5-301, 76-5-301.1, and 76-5-302; 
(g) mayhem, as described in Section 76-5-105; 
(h) sexual offenses, as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses, and 
Title 76, Chapter 5a, Sexual Exploitation of Children; 
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(i) stalking, as described in Section 76-5-106.5; 
(j) unlawful detention, as described in Section 76-5-304; 
(k) violation of a protective order or ex parte protective order, as described in Section 
76-5-108; 
(1) any offense against property described in Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, Property 
Destruction, Part 2, Burglary and Criminal Trespass, or Part 3, Robbery; 
(m) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, as described in Section 76-
10-507; 
(n) discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in the direction of any 
person, building, or vehicle, as described in Section 76-10-508; 
(o) disorderly conduct, as defined in Section 76-9-102, if a conviction of disorderly 
conduct is the result of a plea agreement in which the defendant was originally charged 
with any of the domestic violence offenses otherwise described in this Subsection (4). 
Conviction of disorderly conduct as a domestic violence offense, in the manner described 
in this Subsection (4)(o), does not constitute a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence 
under 18 U.S.C. Section 921, and is exempt from the provisions of the federal Firearms 
Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 921 et seq.; or 
(p) child abuse as described in Section 76-5-109.1. 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as 
defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in 
writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, 
receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the 
plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
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